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Emeriging constitutional conflicts and the role of courts
n Marbury v. Madison, decided in
1803, Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote: "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what
the law is."
Ma.FShall made this statement in
the course of explaining why the
court should not enforce a federal
statute that conflicted with the Constitution. The statement thus served
to justify the practice of judicial re.
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view. But what if anything does it imply about how actively courts should
seek to define constitutional boundaries?
Does the Marbury statement.
merely seek to justify a straightlorward choice-of-law principle - i.e.,
that courts must enforce superior Jaw
<such as constitutional law) when
faced with situatiohs where superior
and inferior laws conflict?
Or does it suggest that the courts

should play a special role in maintaining our constitutional equilibrium i.~. that interpreting the Constitution
is a particularly 1.egal exercise in
which judges have special expertise?
If the latter meaning was intended,
the statement might well be taken as
ajudicial call to action.
Throughout its history, the
Supreme Court. has at tiines em~
braced the former view, and at other
SEE CONSTTIVTION 03
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times the latter.
Advocates for the former,
more restrained view emphasize that it functions as a prodemocracy default rule. And
they see this as a good thing.
When a court exercises judicial review, it tells
Congress, the executive
branch or a state to refrain
from action tbat is under way
or to take some action that is
not being taken. Either way, a
democratically accountable
institution is told that it cannot do what the people (presumably) want it to do, or that
it must do what the people
(presumably) do not want it to
do.
Advocates fur judicial re- '
straint say that such occasions should be kept to a minimum. It is destabilizing when

courts tell democratic majori- ample, when faced with a law·
suit raising a constitutional
ties that they cannot have
claim, they do .n ot lightly contheir way. And it can be danclude that the plaintiff has
gerous when courts do so
with frequency or without suf- suffered an irtjury sufficient to
ficient sensitivity to the politi- confer "standing'' to litigate
the cas.e. And if the plaintiff
cal consequences.
does have standing, they tend
Note that this view does
not necessarily involve.a lim- to look for non-constitutional
ited conception of the breadth grounds on which to decide
the case. Finally, if they must
of constitutional rights. One
might well believe, for examissue a constitutional ruling,
they tend to state it in the
ple, that the Constitution
should be broadly read to pro- narrowest possible terms.
tect a right to abortion or to
Advocates for a broader
understanding of the Marsame-sex marriage while sibury statement tend to emmultaneously believing that
phasize the hazards of unbrithe judiciary should be cautious about involving itself.in . died democracy, the threat
controversies that implicate
posed by political dysfunction
and the need to protect .miissues such as these.
nority rights. They argue that
Judges holding the reif the Constitution is to enstrained view tend to favor
what law professor Alexander dure, there must be a method
fot operationalizing it when
Bickel called "the passive
its llinitations are viewed as
virtues" of inaction. For ex-

inexpedient by those who hold
pPwer in the political
branches.
History teaches, they say,
that robust exercises of the
power of judicial review are
necessary to keep us, in the
words of John Adams, a "government of laws, and not of
men." Judges are by~
inclined toward the vindiattion of principle. And the
framers gave federal judges
lifetime tenure and salary
protection precisely because
they saw a need for a branch
of the federal government to
take the long view.
We appear to be headed
into a period that will be rife
with constitutional conflicts.
Some of these conflicts will
become lawsuits. How will the
courts respond? How should
they respond?
Just this week, a govern-

ment accountability organization filed a lawsuit claiming
that, by failing to divest from
ownership of businesses that
.r eceive payments from enti- '
ties owned by foreigp. governments1 President Donald
Trump is violating the Constitution's Fbreign Emoluments
Clause. This clause prohibits
e person holding ''any Office
of Profit.or Trust" from accepting any "Emolument"
from a foreign state.
There is a lively debate
about whether the president
holds an "Office of Profit or
Trust" within the meaning of
the clause and, if so, whether
a payment received by his one
of his businesses constitutes
an "Emolument." But the
case also presents a _significant threshold question:
whether the plaintiff. organization has suffered an irtjury

sufficient to give it the standing to litiga:te these issues.
The organization claims
that President Trump's unconstitutional conduct is
causing it to divert resources
from other government accountability projects in order
to monitor him. Is this enough
to confer standing? In deciding this quesUon, the.court
will have to define and apply
the concept of "injury." But it
also will be giving a new gloss
to Justice Marshall's old
maxim about the scope of the
judicial role.
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